| KEYWORD |
Evaluating a side-channel simulation tool against real power traces of cryptographic software
Tesi esterna in azienda
Parole chiave CRYPTOGRAPHY, SIDE-CHANNEL
Riferimenti DANILO BAZZANELLA
Riferimenti esterni Matteo Bocchi (ST Microelectronics)
Gruppi di ricerca Crittografia e teoria dei numeri
Tipo tesi TESI IN AZIENDA
Descrizione Side-channel attacks are a real threat to embedded devices running cryptographic software. Particularly, power analysis takes advantage of the power consumption information of a device in order to retrieve secret data involved in the cryptographic computations.
Some simulation tools have been developed to help with the analysis of those vulnerabilities, simplifying the process with respect to running on real embedded targets.
This project aims to analyze how much the simulated traces produced by the simulation tools, in this case Rainbow, are comparable to real power consumption traces, and how much using these simulators can help in finding and removing side-channel vulnerabilities.
As first step, the student could understand the benefits and limitations of Rainbow, and then develop a framework allowing a better usability with ST embedded targets.
Finally, the traces generated by the tool should be validated against real power traces acquired on ARM Cortex-M microcontroller, thanks to NewAE Technology ChipWhisperer tool.
Scadenza validita proposta 22/04/2023
PROPONI LA TUA CANDIDATURA