Effective and secure challenge-response protocol for FPGA-based PUFs (Physical Unclonable Functions)
Parole chiave EMBEDDED SYSTEMS, FPGA-BASED DESIGN, HARDWARE DESIGN, HARDWARE SECURITY, PUFS (PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS), SECUBE, SECURITY
Riferimenti PAOLO ERNESTO PRINETTO
Riferimenti esterni Nicolò MAUNERO (CINI Cybersecurity National Laboratory)
Antonio VARRIALE (Blu5 Labs Ltd)
Gruppi di ricerca GR-21 - TESTGROUP - TESTGROUP
Tipo tesi MASTER THESIS
Descrizione Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have become a promising technique for hardware-based security primitives thanks to their peculiar characteristics and low cost.
PUFs derive their uniqueness form certain physical characteristics of the device that occurred during the manufacturing or process variation. PUFs can be used to extract chip-unique signature, IP protection and device authentication. A number of FPGA based PUF designs have been reported for applications such as secure key generation and device authentication, seed for PRNG, IP protection, random number generation, etc.
It is inferable from its name that a PUF performs a functional operation: it receives an input (challenge) and produces an output (response). Each input challenge together with its measured response receive the name of challenge-response pair (CRP).
The aim of this Thesis is to develop the challenge-response protocol to be used in the SEcube™ in order to interrogate FPGA-based PUFs. The challenge-response protocol should be integrated in the device firmware enhancing its functionalities giving the possibility of leverage on the peculiar characteristics and inherent security of PUFs.
- CINI Cybersecurity National Lab
Note The thesis activities will be carried out in collaboration with:
- CINI Cybersecurity National Laboratory
For additional informations:
- Nicolò MAUNERO – nicolo.maunero@@consorzio-cini.it
- Samuele Ives CERINI - firstname.lastname@example.org
Scadenza validita proposta 31/12/2023 PROPONI LA TUA CANDIDATURA