Analisi e controllo di dinamiche di teoria dei giochi in popolazioni
Descrizione Controlling evolutionary game-theoretic dynamics is a problem of paramount importance, with several applications spanning from social sciences to ecological and engineering fields.
In this thesis, we focus on the problem of controlling a population game, toward steering such a population to a specified equilibrium that represents a desired collective behavior. For example, to promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma.
In our research group, we proposed a family of controllers to achieve our goal. The objective of this thesis is to investigate the performance of such class and optimize them using tools from the theory of dynamics on networks, optimization, and control
For some details on population games, see:
- Lorenzo Zino, Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani, On imitation dynamics in potential population games (available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.04748)
- Hofbauer & Sigmund, Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics (book available at the Library of DISMA)
Conoscenze richieste Knowledge of dynamical systems of ODEs
Knowledge of optimization
Scadenza validita proposta 06/05/2024 PROPONI LA TUA CANDIDATURA