Evaluating a side-channel simulation tool against real power traces of cryptographic software
Thesis in external company
Reference persons DANILO BAZZANELLA
External reference persons Matteo Bocchi (ST Microelectronics)
Research Groups Crittografia e teoria dei numeri
Thesis type THESIS WITH A COMPANY
Description Side-channel attacks are a real threat to embedded devices running cryptographic software. Particularly, power analysis takes advantage of the power consumption information of a device in order to retrieve secret data involved in the cryptographic computations.
Some simulation tools have been developed to help with the analysis of those vulnerabilities, simplifying the process with respect to running on real embedded targets.
This project aims to analyze how much the simulated traces produced by the simulation tools, in this case Rainbow, are comparable to real power consumption traces, and how much using these simulators can help in finding and removing side-channel vulnerabilities.
As first step, the student could understand the benefits and limitations of Rainbow, and then develop a framework allowing a better usability with ST embedded targets.
Finally, the traces generated by the tool should be validated against real power traces acquired on ARM Cortex-M microcontroller, thanks to NewAE Technology ChipWhisperer tool.
Deadline 22/04/2023 PROPONI LA TUA CANDIDATURA